With the advancement of Internet of Things (IoT), a large number of electronic devices are connected to the Internet. These connected electronic devices acquire and transmit information, and respond to any received actions. In the medical ecosystem, hospitals can implement medical diagnosis (MD) with medical sensors, especially for remote auxiliary MD. But, in this context, patients' privacy (PP) is of paramount importance, and confidentiality of medical data is crucial. Therefore, the main challenge ahead is how to realize remote auxiliary MD while protecting confidentiality of the medical data and ensuring PP. In this article, based on somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme addressed by Junfeng Fan and Frederik Vercauteren (FV), we provide the first instance of a new efficient SHE scheme for homomorphic evaluation over single instruction multiple data (SIMD). We also implement a new set of efficient SIMD homomorphic comparison and division schemes. Based on these findings, we implement efficient privacy preserving and SIMD homomorphic surf and multiretina-image matching schemes. Offered functionalities include SIMD homomorphic feature point detection, multiretina-image matching, and lesion detection for the encrypted retinal image of diabetic retinopathy. Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept application implementation toward remote auxiliary diagnosis systems for diabetes in order to showcase the core security and privacy pillars of our solution. In the meantime, our IoT system designed with lattice-based cryptography preserves data confidentiality under quantum computation and quantum computers.
I. INTRODUCTION
I NTERNET of Things (IoT) [1] is a very large network connecting electronic devices all over the world, and this emerging trend is currently changing the communication landscape. Using connected house appliances, users enjoy convenient and intelligent services of life [2] . Connected sensors, such as humidity sensors, temperature sensors, light sensors, and so on, can realize automatic and intelligent industrial manufacturing and agricultural cultivation [3] . Sensors in vehicles [4] can sense the status of vehicles and roads in real time. In hospitals, doctors can utilize sensors to monitor patients in real time [5] , [6] . Sensors can also be used for auxiliary disease diagnosis and treatment remotely [7] - [9] .
However, transmission, storage, and utilization of the data acquired from sensors of IoT involve data confidentiality (DC) and users' privacy [10] - [12] . With the acquired data from sensors in a house, malicious attackers can control and take advantage of house appliances, and even spy on a user's life. Egregious attacks can destroy industrial and agricultural production, and even threaten a user's life in intelligent driving. For industrial and agricultural users, commercial competitors can attack sensors to destroy industrial and agricultural production of their competitors. In the field of intelligent driving, once attackers acquire data from vehicle sensors, they can not only obtain driving states and tracks of vehicles but also maliciously cause traffic accidents by controlling vehicle sensors.
Especially in the health and medical ecosystems, patients' health condition and medical information, which can only be accessed by their attending physicians, are sensitive [e.g., acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis, cardiopathy, diabetes, etc.]. The leak of sensitive health condition and medical information could cause great distress and discrimination against patients, and indeed affect their treatment, work, and life [13] . To protect DC and patient privacy (PP), we can utilize traditional encryption schemes to encrypt all of the data acquired from medical sensors. Encrypted data from medical sensors is transmitted and stored in IoT.
Nonetheless, the traditional encryption schemes cannot support direct computational operation for the encrypted data [14] , 2327-4662 c 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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such as the advanced encryption standard (AES) scheme, the triple data encryption algorithm (DEA), the elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES), etc. (see [15] - [17] ). After acquiring encrypted patients medical data by the medical sensors, doctors decrypt the encrypted medical data, and do with the decrypted medical data to make a diagnosis for patients diseases. Another case is that doctors want to make full use of a cloud server (CS) for the auxiliary diagnosis to reduce their heavy workloads. When doctors use a CS to perform auxiliary diagnosis with machine leaning algorithms, a CS first decrypts the encrypted medical data acquired from medical sensors, and then utilizes the decrypted medical data and machine learning algorithms to perform efficient auxiliary diagnosis directly. Neither of these cases preserves DC from the medical sensors, because the medical data is decrypted when performing medical diagnosis (MD). Therefore, there is the possibility of breaching PP. Currently, the rapid development of quantum computation and computer heralds the advent of the era of quantum computation [18] , while the traditional encryption schemes are not quantum-resistant encryption schemes, such as Triple DEA, ECIES, Paillier, etc. (see [19] , [20] ). In order to perform the auxiliary diagnosis with encrypted data and machine learning schemes via a CS, and protect users' privacy in the era of quantum computation, an efficient quantum-resistant homomorphic encryption scheme is one of the best options.
Motivation and Contributions: A CS has powerful computation and storage capabilities. With a CS, doctors can utilize medical data from sensors and machine learning algorithms to perform efficient auxiliary diagnosis to reduce their heavy workloads. Patients living in remote areas can also hold high levels of disease diagnosis. In order to preserve DC from medical sensors and PP, and avail of a CS to complete auxiliary diagnosis with machine leaning algorithms over encrypted medical data, we propose a secure and efficient MD system, which can carry out the following functionalities.
1) High Efficient and Complex Homomorphic Evaluation: Efficiency of encryption scheme is very important for tiny appliance of IoT (e.g., fast encryption and decryption, low storage and communication cost, efficient homomorphic evaluation, etc.). Image processing and machine learning algorithms require complex homomorphic evaluation, such as homomorphic comparison and division over the encrypted data. Our designed homomorphic encryption scheme supports small encryption key and encrypted image size, low communication cost, and efficient and complex homomorphic evaluation.
2) Homomorphic Image Processing and Machine
Learning: In our medical IoT system, all computations are performed with homomorphic evaluation. A doctor can directly utilize a CS to perform auxiliary MD by homomorphic image processing and machine learning. This greatly reduces the doctors' workloads, and improves the diagnosis efficiency of doctors and service capability of hospitals. 3) Quantum Resistance: Quantum computation model makes many hard problems (in classical computation) used in cryptography much less difficult. The quantum computer would render all widely used traditional encryption schemes insecure [21] . Our homomorphic encryption scheme based on lattice is quantum resistance. All of the medical data in our IoT system is also secure under the quantum computation model and a quantum computer. Medical data can be securely transmitted and stored in our IoT system for a long time. To realize the above functionalities, we use somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) proposed by Fan and Vercauteren (FV) as the basic encryption scheme [22] . The FV scheme is based on ideal lattice (quantum resistance), and has small public key. In the meantime, we employ single instruction multiple data (SIMD) to pack multibits into a single ciphertext, and perform parallel homomorphic evaluation. Packing technology can compress ciphertext for transmission and storage. Parallelism improves the efficiency of homomorphic evaluation. With the help of above optimized FV scheme, we design the new efficient homomorphic comparison and division schemes. Homomorphic comparison scheme (HCS) has low communication cost between two parties. Utilizing our designed homomorphic schemes, a CS can implement medical image processing (MIP) (SIMD is very efficient for image processing [23] ) and machine learning about auxiliary MD over the encrypted medical data.
Our IoT system acquires patients' retinal images of diabetic retinopathy (DR) by the camera sensor connected to a Raspberry Pi (RP) [24] . The acquired retinal images are encrypted with our homomorphic encryption in an RP. The encrypted retinal images are transmitted in our IoT system, and stored in a CS, which performs efficient auxiliary diabetes diagnosis. We proved that our IoT system is the known plaintext attack (KPA) [25] and the ciphertext only attack (COA) [26] security in honest-but-curious [25] . KPA security is an attack in which an attacker has the samples of both the plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. An attacker conducts an analysis with the samples of both the plaintext and corresponding ciphertext to get the secret key used to encrypt and decrypt the information. COA security is an attack in which an attacker has only the knowledge of ciphertext. An attacker conducts an analysis ciphertext to get the secret key used to encrypt and decrypt the information. The honest-but-curious model is a secure computation (or a protocol) where the attackers are restricted to follow all of the computation steps (or a protocol), but after implementing computation steps (or a protocol), they may analyze the data they have received to try to recover inputs. In our IoT system, encrypted retinal images of DR are just like in a black box. Homomorphic image processing and machine learning algorithms cannot reveal image content and diagnostic results. A good balance of storage overhead, communication cost, computational efficiency, and privacy protection is achieved by our IoT system.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model and threat model. Then, we provide security and privacy requirements of our system in Section III. In Section IV, we describe the preliminaries and related work before providing system architecture in Section V. Then, in Section VI, the detailed system scheme is offered. Next, we give the detailed security and privacy analysis of our system in Section VII, and describe the system performance evaluation in Section VIII. Finally, we provide the conclusion of this article in Section IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we present our system model and threat model.
A. System Model
Our IoT system implements privacy-preserving auxiliary diabetes diagnosis with sensors as shown in Fig. 1 . Our system model includes the following constituent elements.
Patient (P i ) and Sensor (S i ): P i is a potential diabetic patient. A camera (Raspberry Pi Noir Camera V2), a handheld condensing lens and RP constitute a sensor (S i ), which acquires patients' retinal images of DR [27] and encrypts them. 
B. Threat Model
Our IoT system preserves the confidentiality of the retinal images of DR and PP [28] . In our threat model, we mainly consider the following threats.
1) Threats to Confidentiality of the Retinal Images of DR:
Threats to confidentiality of the retinal images of DR mainly comes from the security of our SIMD homomorphic encryption scheme, encrypted data transmission, and storage and processing of the encrypted retinal images of DR in our IoT system. Malicious attackers can use the quantum computation model (or a quantum computer) to analyze and attack the encryption scheme. In the process of encrypted data transmission, a malicious attacker can eavesdrop and obtain the encrypted data. A portable device (a sensor in our IoT system), doctors' computers, and a CS store the encrypted data and homomorphic evaluation results over the encrypted data. A cloud service provider, a portable device provider, a computer provider, and a malicious attacker can obtain the encrypted data. 2) CS Is Honest-But-Curious: CS can also keep a detailed record of each operation and the result of each operation performed by our schemes in our IoT system. CS may want to recover the plaintext of the encrypted data, and reveal the content of images of DR and the final diagnostic results. Especially, in the honest-but-curious model [25] , CS can correctly perform all the schemes in our IoT system. In the meanwhile, CS takes advantage of all the operating recordings and acquired encrypted data to perform analysis for the benefit of a cloud service provider.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we provide the security and privacy requirements of our IoT system for the DC and PP. The security and privacy requirements include the following aspects.
DC: In our IoT system, patients' retinal images of DR are transmitted and stored at different devices (CS, S i , H's servers, and doctors' computers). The encrypted retinal images of DR for transmission and storage cannot be broken by the quantum computation model (or a quantum computer), because our
IoT system uses our quantum-resistant homomorphic encryption scheme. Therefore, the encrypted data stored in CS, H's servers, S i , and doctors' computers cannot reveal the contents of retinal images of DR for patients.
Homomorphic retinal image processing of DR in our IoT system cannot reveal the contents of retinal images of DR, including the pixel value, the feature point location, and the extracted feature vectors. In the meantime, homomorphic machine learning cannot reveal the classification results of retinal images of DR. The reason for getting the above results is that image processing and machine learning are implemented with homomorphic evaluation based on ideal lattice over encrypted data. The hospital internal data interaction makes use of the authentic and secure channel between the H's servers and doctor's computers [29] , [30] , so it cannot reveal the contents of retinal images of DR.
Because our SIMD SHE scheme is malleable [31] , [32] , tamper attacks about encrypted data transmission and storage are not considered for security in our IoT system. PP: Retinal images of DR contain the patient's medical information. In our IoT system, transmission and storage of the encrypted medical images cannot reveal the contents of the retinal images of DR. During homomorphic image processing and image classification with machine learning, the CS and H's servers cannot reveal any information of the retinal images of DR either. During the auxiliary diagnosis with an S i , a CS, and H's servers, the retinal images of DR stored in an S i , a CS, and H's servers are encrypted by our homomorphic encryption. Any information of the retinal images of DR cannot be revealed by an S i , a CS, and H's servers. For the doctor's final diagnosis, H's servers and the doctor's computers preserve the security of diagnostic results by authentic and secure channel [29] , [30] . PP is protected during the hospital's internal data interaction. Hence, PP is protected in the whole diagnostic processing.
IV. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we present SHE, speed-up robust features (surf ) (feature extraction of a medical image), and machine learning schemes. These schemes are the basis for constructing our efficient IoT system.
A. SHE Scheme
Homomorphic encryption includes the partially homomorphic encryption (PHE), SHE, and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. PHE only supports the multiplicative homomorphic evaluation (e.g., RSA [31] ) or additive homomorphic evaluation (e.g., Paillier [32] ). To construct an FHE scheme, we first construct an SHE scheme, which supports a certain number of additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluations. When adding a bootstrapping operation to an SHE scheme, we can convert it into an FHE scheme. Based on ideal lattice, Gentry [33] , [34] proposed the first FHE scheme in 2009. An FHE scheme supports any times of additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluation simultaneously. The FHE scheme from ring learning with errors (RLWE) [35] - [42] is more efficient than the FHE scheme from learning with errors (LWE). But an FHE scheme with bootstrapping is inefficient.
An SHE scheme based on RLWE is more efficient than an FHE scheme based on LWE. In [41] , the authors compare SHE FV scheme [22] with another SHE (YASHE) scheme [42] . In [43] , an SHE scheme (BGV) presented by Brakerski et al. [37] is compared with the YASHE scheme [42] . The SHE FV scheme has smaller ciphertexts than the BGV scheme. We chose the SHE FV scheme as our basic encryption scheme. LetẼ be the SHE FV scheme, and m i (i = 1, 2) be the plaintext. For c 1 and c 2 (c 1 =Ẽ(m 1 ) and c 2 =Ẽ(m 2 )), the SHE FV scheme can get the following results:
B. Surf Scheme
Bay et al. [44] presented the surf scheme, which uses the Hessian matrix-based measure for the detector and a distribution-based descriptor. Use of a Hessian matrix utilizing box filters (BFs) simplifies the computation of feature point detection. Distribution-based description of feature point also simplifies the computation of descriptor. The surf scheme can realize real-time image feature detection, and becomes more efficient than the scale invariant feature transform (Sift) algorithm [45] - [47] . The scheme details are introduced in Supplement B. The main computation steps of the surf scheme are as follows.
Conversion From Gray Image to Integral Image: We first convert a gray image (Ĩ) of image I to an integral image. The integral image ofĨ in the pixel grid ( ) is computed as follows: ∀(x, y) (pixel ofĨ) ∈ , the corresponding integral image pixel isĨ
Hessian Matrix Construction and Eigenvalue Computation:
Making use of BFs, we can complete a simplified approximate computing of the Hessian matrix. The convolution of BF with the discrete image I can be computed with the integral imagẽ I:
The first-order partial derivative computing can be approximately completed with BF at different scales (L):
For multiscale computing, the second-order partial derivative computing can be approximately completed with BF at different L: where T i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 8) is a rectangular domain. Finally, we get the determinant approximation of the Hessian matrix:
In general, we let w = 0.9.
Construction of Gaussian Pyramid and Scalar Space:
We make use of the Gaussian pyramid to construct the scalar space. The Gaussian pyramid is divided into different octaves, which are divided into a lot of levels. Different octaves have the same image size. But the template sizes of BF are increased gradually. Different levels of an octave have the same filter, but fuzziness is different.
Feature Point Detection: After constructing scale space with BF, we can complete feature point detection as follows.
1) Filtration of Feature Point: In order to detect saddle points, we utilize the scale-normalized determinant of the Hessian matrix to complete it as follows: There are four values in each subregion. Finally, a 64-D vector μ k = (μ k (i, j)) 1<i,j<4 is obtained. This is the descriptor of a feature point.
C. Machine Learning Scheme
is the feature set for the I (i) th retinal image of DR. Because pairwise matching for retinal images of DR is inefficient, our application implements the multi-image matching scheme called multi-image matching via density-based clustering [48] to classify the retinal images of DR. The core part of multi-image matching via density-based clustering is the quick-match scheme. It is an efficient data clustering scheme with linear time complexity.
Quick-match scheme first collects and puts all the feature points of retinal images of DR (a (1)
. . , M}) into a tree. Then, the constructed tree is broken into different clusters, which represent different multi-image matching. We can define a density function DF. Based on density estimation, we can construct the feature point tree. For the given feature point a (e) I (s) , the parent node from another image in the tree can be computed by Parent function. Finally, we can break the constructed tree into clusters, which correspond to the multi-image matching. The algorithm is terminated until all the edges are considered. The scheme details are introduced in Supplement C.
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide our IoT system architecture including a high-level overview. Our IoT system architecture contains the following three modules as shown in Fig. 2 : encryption scheme, application, and management over the encrypted retinal images of DR.
A. High-Level Overview
Our IoT system mainly performs privacy-preserving auxiliary MD through image processing and machine leaning schemes with a cloud service. The execution process is as follows.
1) System starts and calls for the camera connected to RP to acquire patients' retinal images of DR. RP calls for the encryption algorithm, performs encryption operation and uploads the encrypted retinal images of DR. H's CA center distributes the digital certificates for the public key, which is used for S i to execute our SIMD SHE scheme. We show this as process 1 in our IoT system architecture. At the same time, H's servers and doctors' computers build a secure and authenticated channel for secure data and doctors' final diagnosis transmission. We show this as process 6 in our IoT system architecture. Such secure and authenticated channel is easy to implement by post-quantum key exchange protocol [49] , [50] . This is beyond the scope of this article.
Medical Image Acquisition and Encryption (MIAE): In our IoT system, H utilizes S i and lens to acquire patients' retinal images of DR. We show this as process 2 in our IoT system architecture. 
VI. SYSTEM SCHEME-PRIVACY-PRESERVING SERVICES
In this section, we first present our encoding and SIMD SHE schemes. Then, our SIMD homomorphic comparison and division schemes are constructed through our encoding and SIMD SHE schemes. Ultimately, we present our SIMD homomorphic surf, clustering, and multi-image matching schemes.
A. Our Encoding Scheme
Our IoT system refers to computing about fixed point real numbers. In general, homomorphic encryption based on RLWE only supports integer and polynomial computing. In order to implement our IoT system, we need to encode fixed point real numbers into polynomial under certain accuracy and reliability.
We convert a fixed point real number into an unsigned integer as follows. We multiply a fixed point real number with a larger factor first. Then, all of the fixed point real numbers are converted into integers. Each integer is expressed with complement. All of the integers are converted into unsigned integers. Making use of encoding in GF(2 ) field, it is conventional to express the elements of GF(2 ) as binary numbers. Usually, letting GF(2 ) = GF(2 8 ) for image processing [21] , we can convert the unsigned integer into a polynomial, which is (2) . Finally, the fixed point real number can be represented as polynomial.
B. Our SIMD SHE FV
SIMD technology [37] can implement the same operation on inputs parasynchronously. Namely, in our SIMD SHE scheme, SIMD technology can perform homomorphic evaluation for -bits plaintext simultaneously.
, and then pack independent messages (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ) into the unique element (one ciphertext R 2 = Z 2 [x]/( d (X))). This greatly improves the efficiency of homomorphic evaluation. c 1 is the ciphertext of plaintext (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ), and c 2 is the ciphertext of plaintext (m 0 , . . . , m −1 ). Finally, we can perform the homomorphic evaluation: 
Algorithm 1 SIMD Homomorphic Comparison Algorithm
Input:
x, y and public key pk , where x = x 1 x 2 · · · x n and y = y 1 y 2 · · · y n . Output:
x > y or x < y. 1: x and y are encrypted with E. Base on our encoding and packing methods, E(x) = E(x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) and E(y) = E(y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ). E(x) and E(y) are uploaded to CS. 
C. Our Homomorphic Comparison Scheme
For homomorphic image processing and machine learning (feature detection and description, feature point matching, clustering algorithm, etc.), homomorphic comparison over the encrypted data is a basic operation.
We utilize a comparator in digital system to perform comparison of two numbers (x, y). The comparator is a logic circuit for comparison on two numbers (x, y). The computational results are divided into two conditions, namely, G(x > y) or M(x < y). With the help of a single-bit digit-comparator, we can construct a parallel multibit digital comparator. Table I shows the single-bit digit-comparator over the encrypted data.
According to our encoding scheme in GF(2 ), the user encodes two one-bit integers x 0 and y 0 as polynomials. Then, x 0 and y 0 are encrypted, and uploaded to CS. CS performs homomorphic comparison with comparator:
Two fixed real numbers x and y are encoded as polynomials, where the coefficients of polynomials are in GF (2) . Based on the above packing technology, we can pack x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n and y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n into E(x) and E(y). Using the SIMD technology, we implement homomorphic comparison over the encrypted data. Algorithm 1 gives our detailed SIMD homomorphic comparison algorithm.
In our homomorphic comparison algorithm, G = 1 or M = 1 stand for x > y or x < y, respectively. The H's server returns G = 1 or M = 1 to CS. Finally, CS gets x > y or x < y.
D. Our Homomorphic Division Scheme
For homomorphic image processing and machine learning, encrypted data division is another key computation.
Algorithm 2 Homomorphic Repeated-Squaring Algorithm

Input:
E(b(x)) and n. Output:
[E(b(x))] n mod (x); 1: Let n = (k r−1 · · · k i · · · k 0 ) 2 be the binary representation of n. 2 
Homomorphic encryption does not support homomorphic division directly. We can transform division into addition and multiplication, and then perform additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluation over the encrypted data. In the following, we provide the detailed repeated-squaring and conversion algorithms for homomorphic division scheme (HDS).
For two positive integers a and b, we can denote them as polynomial [a(x) and b(x)] by the above-mentioned encoding scheme. E is our SIMD SHE FV scheme. The corresponding ciphertexts are E(a(x)) and E(b(x)), respectively.
Based on the Coyne et al. scheme [51] , we can compute (a/b) approximately. For two positive integers a and b, we can compute a · (1/b). (1/b) can be computed approximately as follows. Let u = 1 − ((b/2 j )) (u ∈ (0, (1/2))). With the help of Taylor series expansion and approximation, we can get
HDS (E([a(x)/b(x)])
) includes the following four algorithms: 1) SHE.Enc; 2) SHE.Add; 3) homomorphic repeatedsquaring; and 4) conversion algorithms. SHE.Enc and SHE.Add algorithms are the same as in our SIMD SHE FV scheme. Algorithms 2 and 3 present the homomorphic repeated-squaring and conversion algorithms in detail.
In order to compute [E(b(x))] n mod (x), we represent n as a sum of power of 2 with the binary representation, that is, n = (k log 2 n · · · k 0 ) 2 , where k i ∈ {0, 1}. Namely, n = log 2 n i=0 k i 2 i . Then, we perform the following computation:
mod (x). We can prepare a list of basics:
can be computed as (( (E(b(x) )) 2 ) 2 · · · ) 2 mod (x). Finally, we can compute [E(b(x))] n mod (x) with log 2 n + h(n) − 1 multiplications, where h(n) is the number of one-bit for the binary representation of n.
Based on the homomorphic repeated-squaring and SHE.Add algorithms, we can compute E(u i ) and n−1 i=0 E(u i ). With the help of homomorphic conversion algorithm, we can compute · (1/b) ).
E. Our Homomorphic Surf Scheme
By means of our SIMD SHE FV, HCS, and HDS schemes, we can implement efficient homomorphic feature
Algorithm 3 Homomorphic Conversion Algorithm
Input: E(a), E(b) and evk(= γ ), where a = a(x) and b = b(x). Output:
where j is the number of bits in b. 2: Call for the homomorphic Repeated-squaring algorithm to com-
point detection with surf scheme over each encrypted retinal image of DR. We provide the detailed description for key steps of the homomorphic surf scheme as follows. Homomorphic Integral Image: First, each retinal image of DR is partitioned into 2 blocks and scrambled [52] . Then, we convert a color image to a gray image and an integral image finally. We can easily get the gray image of I as follows: Then, we can convert the encrypted gray image to the encrypted integral image by additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluation: E(Ĩ(x, y)) = 0≤i≤x 0≤j≤y E (Ĩ(x, y) ).
Homomorphic Evaluation of Hessian Matrix Approximation: We can get determinant approximation of the Hessian matrix by additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluation: E(det(H approx )) = E(BF xx )E(BF yy ) − [E(wBF xy ))] 2 , where w = 0.9. The secondorder partial derivative computing can be approximately completed as follows:
where T i is the rectangular domain as the original surf scheme. 
Finally, we get the determinant approximation of the Hessian matrix by additive and multiplicative homomorphic evaluation. 
and E(H 0 ) with scale (L 0 ) and location (E[(x 0 , y 0 )]) can be computed with homomorphic evaluation in the box space as follows:
, and E[H LL (X 0 )] are computed through homomorphic additive, multiplicative, and division evaluation. 
The sum of all the weighted gradients in a circular neighborhood can be computed as follows: E[BF(x, y) [θ−(π/6),θ+(π/6)] (θ φ )], whereθ φ (∈ [−π, π) ) denotes the angle between φ k (x, y) and the x-axis. Then, the orientation of feature point is computed as follows:
Finally, we get the encrypted main direction of each feature point.
The encrypted weighted gradient at point E [(u, v) ] can be computed as follows:
We can directly compute E[ cos(θ k )] and E[ sin(θ k )] via homomorphic evaluation. In this way, there are four values in each subregion
Finally, the encrypted vector E(μ k ) = E[(μ k (i, j)) 1<i,j<4 ] is obtained. This is the descriptor of a feature point.
F. Homomorphic Diabetic Retinopathy Detection
For the surf -based DR detection schemes [53] , [54] , the training of retinal lesion detectors is the critical factor. All the existing schemes are to take full advantage of the following schemes: surf, clustering (k-means) [or hard-assignment coding/sum pooling (HARD-SUM), and softassignment coding/max pooling (SOFT-MAX)], bag-of-visualwords (BoVW), and two-class classifier [support vector machine (SVM)] schemes. The key ideas of the existing schemes are to use the surf scheme to detect the low-level points of interest (PoIs) with a region of interest (RoI) containing specific lesions indicated by experts for DR. Then, utilizing clustering (k-means) (or HARD-SUM and SOFT-MAX) to create BoVW (or max-pooling) for training two-class classifier (SVM) of the lesion detectors. Finally, a trained twoclass classifier is utilized for the final classification about the individual lesion detectors.
But the above methods need complex clustering (k-means) process (or HARD-SUM and SOFT-MAX) to create BoVW (or max-pooling) for training two-class classifier (SVM) of the lesion detectors, and a trained two-class classifier for the final classification about the individual lesion detectors.
In this section, we use homomorphic fast multiretina-image matching to simplify the whole process of lesions detection and DR detection simultaneously. With the help of the encrypted RoIs containing specific lesions indicated by expert, we can implement the parameter modification of homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes based 
whereh is the density kernel function with bandwidth ρ den D (e) I (1) , ρ den is the user-defined ration (0 < ρ den < 1), a is an arbitrary adaptive amplification factor that depends on D 
. . , M}) of retinal images of DR, we first construct the following encrypted density function: 
I (1) , and σ = ρ den D (2) I (1) . Based on e −x defined by the following power series: e −x = 1 + (−x) + (x 2 /2!) + ((−x) 3 /3!) + · · · + ((−x) n /n!) + · · · , we can approximately compute E[h(x, a (e) ·) is the distance for the feature point space. We can compute E[D(a 
3) Finally, for the previous constructed tree, we implement homomorphic break to form different clusters, which correspond to the encrypted multiretina-image matching results of DR. Namely, we complete the lesions detection. By our HCS scheme, we can compute. 
and E[MatchDis(C Mat ) ∩ MatchDis(C Mat ) = ∅], which can be implemented with our HCS scheme directly. We can decide the valid edge and merge E[C Mat ] and E[C Mat ] until all the edges are considered. To modify the parameters of the homomorphic surf (PoIs in the RoI) and fast multiretina-image matching schemes (the lesions detection), we utilize encrypted RoIs containing specific lesions indicated by experts with the database. After a certain number of running tests, we can hold the parameters of the homomorphic surf (PoIs in the RoI) and fast multiretinaimage matching schemes (the lesions detection). Based on the determined parameters of the homomorphic surf (PoIs in the RoI) and fast multiretina-image matching schemes (the lesions detection), we can implement the lesions detection for any new encrypted retinal image. From the results of the lesions detection, we can achieve DR detection.
VII. SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
For the security of our IoT system, we mainly consider our SIMD SHE FV, HCS, HDS, homomorphic surf, and clustering schemes according to our threat model.
Based on our threat model, confidentiality of the retinal images of DR mainly relies on the security of our SIMD SHE FV scheme, transmission, storage, and processing of the encrypted retinal images of DR in our IoT system. Our SIMD SHE FV scheme is a quantum-resistant encryption scheme based on lattice. The data is encrypted during the transmission process. The processing over the encrypted retinal images of DR in our IoT system is homomorphic evaluation. Therefore, confidentiality of the retinal images of DR in our IoT system is guaranteed even in the era of quantum computation.
According to our threat model, CS is honest-but-curious. When CS implements HCS, HDS, homomorphic surf, and clustering schemes, CS wants to get the encryption parameters g 1 and g 2 or e 1 and e 2 for revealing x or y. Finally, CS wants to obtain the content about the retinal images of DR and their classification results. We mainly consider the KPA and COA attacks. Under KPA and COA attacks, for our IoT system, any information about each retinal image of DR and its classification is not revealed by CS. PP can be preserved in our IoT system. Definition 1 (Ring-Learning With Error Problem [36] ): Ring-learning with error problem is the problem to distinguish with non-negligible probability between independent samples (a i , [a i s + e i ] q ) from the RLWE distribution and the same number of independent samples (a i , b i ) from the uniform distribution on R q × R q .
Definition 2 (α − BDD Problem [55] ): Let a lattice L and a vector y (within distance α · λ 1 (L)), α − BDD problem is to find a lattice point x ∈ L within distance α · λ 1 (L) from the target.
Theorem 1 (Security of the HCS Scheme): HCS is COA and KPA security.
Proof: For HCS, we can prove it is COA and KPA security. When CS obtains x > y or x < y, CS wants to derive x or y. CS selects a threshold , where < x or > y. CS encrypted with parametersã,b, g 3 , e 1 , and e 2 . CS can compute c 1 [52] . Scramble causes one of the subimages to have 2 possible location. The joint image has 2 ! possible combination. When ≥ 5, the probability of CS to get the original partitioned image is negligible. Hence, our homomorphic surf scheme is COA and KPA security.
When CS performs the homomorphic multi-image clustering, it employs HCS and HDS schemes. Based on the security of our HCS, HD, and homomorphic surf, the homomorphic multi-image clustering scheme is COA and KPA security. 
A. Efficiency Analysis of SIMD SHE FV and SIMD SHE FV-Based Schemes
In this section, we provide efficiency analysis of our SIMD SHE FV, HDS, and HCS schemes.
For the retinal image processing of DR, the pixel value of a gray image is in the range [0, 256]. Making use of our encoding method, each value of the pixel can be encoded as a polynomial in the finite field GF(2 8 ). Security parameter λ = 80 for RLWE-based SHE is quantum resistant [41] - [43] . Our SIMD SHE FV scheme chooses the following parameters: λ = 80 and R 2 8 = Z 2 8 [X]/(X 8192 + 1). Such parameters meet up with security and application requirements of our IoT system. Table II shows that our SIMD SHE FV scheme has smaller (public and private) key and ciphertext size than the BGV SHE scheme [37] . The times for key generation and homomorphic evaluation (homomorphic addition and multiplication) are much shorter than the BGV SHE scheme. For the retinal images of DR acquired by the camera, the sensor takes average 524 ms to encrypt each acquired image. The ciphertext size of each retinal image of DR is about 68.52 MB. Fig. 3(a) shows the efficiency analysis of our HDS scheme. By means of our repeated-squaring and conversion algorithms, CS can efficiently perform homomorphic division evaluation by HDS scheme. For an 8-bit or 32-bit number, CS can implement homomorphic division evaluation in 150 or 650 ms. Fig. 3(b) presents the efficiency analysis of our HCS scheme. We compare our HCS scheme with secure comparison protocol based on garbled circuit [59] . The result shows that our HCS scheme is more efficient than secure comparison protocol based on garbled circuit. It is because our HCS scheme just computes E(M) and E(G) once by SIMD operation, which greatly reduces the interaction number and the bit number of two different numbers to compare between the CS and the H's server.
B. Efficiency Analysis of Our Homomorphic Surf Scheme
In this section, we provide the efficiency analysis of our homomorphic surf scheme for feature detection of each retinal image of DR. At the same time, we compare communication cost of the feature detection via our HCS scheme with secure comparison protocol based on garbled circuit between the CS and the H's server. The retinal image databases of DR (DR1 [56] , RetiDB database [57] , and Messidor database [58]) include five abnormal findings in the eye fundus caused by DR: 1) microaneuryms (MAs); 2) hemorrhages (HMs); 3) hard exudates (HEs); 4) soft exudate (SE); and 5) neovascularization (NV). Red lesions include MAs and HMs. Bright lesions include HEs and SE [60] . We mainly consider the retinal image of DR (containing MAs, HMs, HEs, SEs, and NV) for feature detection with the original surf and our homomorphic surf schemes. Fig. 4(a) and (c) shows the same retinal image of DR. Fig. 4(b) shows feature detection of a gray retinal image of DR with original surf scheme. Fig. 4(d) shows the result of the feature detection (with our homomorphic surf scheme) for a gray retinal image of DR in the encrypted domain (the detection results recovered from encrypted data to decrypted data). The results of feature point detection shown in Fig. 4(b) and (d) demonstrate our homomorphic surf scheme can efficiently detect the feature points over the encrypted retinal images of DR as the original surf scheme [44] .
In order to detect different abnormal findings in the eye fundus caused by DR, such as MAs, HMs, HEs, SEs, and NV, we chose different parameters for our homomorphic surf scheme. The parameter modification is based on a certain number of running testing results about homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes for PoIs in the RoI and the lesions detection. In this way, according to the feature points detecting results of the encrypted retinal images of DR, we can implement the lesions detection about different abnormal findings in the eye fundus caused by the DR for our efficient homomorphic fast multiretina-image matching scheme. Fig. 4(e) shows the efficiency comparison of feature point detection between the original surf scheme [44] and our homomorphic surf scheme. In about 10 min, our homomorphic surf scheme can finish the feature point detection over the encrypted retinal images of DR. Fig. 4(f) shows the communication cost comparison between our HCS scheme and secure comparison protocol based on garbled circuit [59] during the homomorphic feature point detection. The result proves that our HCS scheme greatly reduces the communication cost. Our HCS scheme used for homomorphic feature point detection is more efficient than secure compare protocol based on garbled circuit [59] .
C. Homomorphic Lesions Detection and Medical Diagnosis
In this section, with the aid of our homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes, we provide experiments about homomorphic lesions detection of the DR and privacy-preserving remote DR diagnosis. Fig. 5(a) shows the efficiency comparison of lesions detection between the original multiretina-image matching and our homomorphic multiretina-image matching schemes. Utilizing our homomorphic multiretina-image matching scheme, a doctor can obtain the results of lesions detection and diagnosis in 7 min. It is more efficient than manual work in hospital, and greatly reduces the doctors' workloads. Fig. 5(b) shows the communication cost comparison of lesions detection of retinal images of DR between our homomorphic surf scheme with HCS and garbled circuit schemes. The results prove that our HCS scheme greatly reduces the communication cost between CS and the hospital's server.
For the automatic detection of DR, we utilize receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves as the comprehensive measure of system performance [53] , [54] , [60] . ROC is created by the sensitivity/specificity pairs for every retinal image of DR. Fig. 5(c) shows the comprehensive measure comparison between the scheme in [53] and our scheme for bright and red lesions detection. The scheme in [53] utilizes the DR1 database to train its system and test the trained system over the RetiDB database. But our homomorphic system utilizes DR1 database to modify parameters about our homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes for PoIs in the RoI and the lesions detection. Then our system utilizes the RetiDB database for testing. For the bright lesions detection, our system results in an AUC = 88.1% as the scheme in [53] with 500 words over the RetiDB database. For the red lesions detection, our system results in an AUC = 76.4% as the scheme in [53] with 200 words over the RetiDB database. Fig. 5(d) shows the comprehensive measure comparison between the scheme in [53] and our scheme for bright and red lesions detection. The scheme in [53] utilizes the DR1 database to train the system and test the trained system over the Messidor database. But our homomorphic system utilizes the DR1 database to modify parameters about our homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes for PoIs in the RoI and the lesions detection. Then our system utilizes the Messidor database for testing. For the bright lesions detection, our system results in an AUC = 89.3% (for 90% sensitivity and 64%) as the scheme in [53] with 500 words over the Messidor database. For the red lesions detection, our system results in AUC = 86.2% of Risk 3 , AUC = 63.3% of Risk 2 , and AUC = 86.2% of Risk 2+3 as the scheme in [53] with 200 words (combined Risk) over the Messidor database.
According to the results, our scheme can efficiently perform classification of the encrypted image of DR.
IX. CONCLUSION
The world has been changed by IoT. Taking advantage of IoT and SHE, we implement privacy-preserving DR detection early. In this article, we provide an SIMD SHE FV scheme. Based on the SIMD SHE FV scheme, we realize efficient homomorphic comparison and division schemes. With the help of our findings, we provide the privacy-preserving homomorphic surf and fast multiretina-image matching schemes, which can perform efficient feature point detection and image matching for retinal images of DR. Finally, by means of homomorphic fast multiretina-image matching, we implement an efficient privacy-preserving remote diagnosis for diabetes. Computation of diagnostic process is homomorphic evaluation in our IoT system. Hence, PP is protected. At the same time, our encryption scheme based on lattice, which is quantum-resistant, can preserve DC even in the era of quantum computation.
